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ABSTRACT
This study identifies the determinants of interstate variation in labor productivity
levels at twenty-year intervals between 1880 and 1980. Focusing on fundamental
rather than proximate influences, we find that institutional characteristics, physical
geography, and resource abundance can account for a high proportion of the
differences in state productivity levels. States with navigable waterways, a large
minerals endowment, and no slaves in 1860, on average, had higher labor
productivity levels throughout the sample period. No consistent support was found
for two other influences given prominence in cross-country analyses of differences in
incomes or productivity levels: climate and the quality of government.
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1. Introduction
The impressive growth of the American economy over the long run has
powerfully influenced policies aimed at lifting productivity and living standards in
much of the world for much of the past century. Yet important questions concerning
the bases of that success are lacking persuasive answers, or the suggested answers
remain controversial. This outcome arises partly because growth theory provides the
empirical growth economist with limited guidance, and partly because arriving at a
persuasive account of the causes of the wealth of nations has been perhaps the
most challenging problem in economics since posed by Adam Smith. Recent
responses to this challenge have included the development of endogenous growth
theories, and an expanded coverage of empirical growth analyses to include nearly
all countries. However, this paper draws on other features of the recent growth
literature to explain U.S. experience. It extends the list of explanatory factors beyond
the proximate influences of physical and human capital and adopts a regional level of
analysis. And its objective is to account for differences in levels of productivity rather
than rates of growth.
In 1880 the United States was poised to overtake Britain as the most efficient
industrial economy, and become the century-long benchmark against which all other
economies’ productivity performance would be compared. Yet in that year it
contained an extraordinary range in productivity levels across states (Figure 1).
Labor productivity in the least productive state (North Carolina) was a mere 18
percent of that in the most productive (Nevada). Excluding the case of Nevada
because of its early stage of settlement and very small population, a comparison withthe second and third most productive states, California and New York, indicates
North Carolina as being only 23.6 and 24.4 percent as productive, respectively.
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Differences of such magnitude between countries would today only be found in
comparisons between developed and developing economies.
2 Until 1940 this wide
range of productivity levels narrowed only gradually, when the least productive state
had a level of labor productivity 25 percent that of the most productive. Thereafter the
gap narrowed more rapidly, with the least productive state reaching 61 percent of the
level of the most productive in 1980. Just as the existence of large productivity gaps
between countries constitutes a major analytical and policy challenge to growth
economists, accounting for the wide disparities in state productivity differences in the
late nineteenth century United States, and their persistence well into the twentieth
century, poses a related challenge, and one that has not been directly addressed.
3
In this paper we offer a novel approach for understanding the productivity
experience of the United States by identifying the determinants of interstate variation
in labor productivity levels at twenty-year intervals between 1880 and 1980. We focus
on possible fundamental sources of that variation (such as geography or institutional
arrangements) rather than the proximate influences (such as investment in physical
and human capital) typically employed in studies explaining variations in rates of
growth of income or productivity. Institutional characteristics, physical geography,
and resource abundance can account for a high proportion of the variation in state
productivity level differences, especially at the beginning of the period studied. No
consistent support was found for two other influences given prominence in the cross-
country regressions of income or productivity levels in recent years: climate and the
quality of government. By focusing on data within a country, we have controlled for
institutional differences that have been difficult to properly account for in many cross-
country studies. Nevertheless, institutions still play a prominent role: the legacy of
slavery has a strong and persistent effect on productivity levels across U.S. states.Following a review of literature and a discussion of our conceptual framework
in the next section, section 3 explains the selection of our hypothesized key
determinants of differences in productivity levels across states, drawing particularly
on the insights embedded in American economic historiography as well as recent
growth analyses. Section 4 discusses the data and also presents the empirical
results, together with an assessment of their robustness by considering alternative
proxies for the explanatory variables. We then explore issues of endogeneity and
possible omitted variable bias (section 5). In section 6 we extend the analysis by
further exploration of some implications of our results. The main contributions and
wider significance of our study are summarized in a concluding section.
2.  Literature and Conceptual Framework
The problem of economic development is widely acknowledged as one of
“accounting for the observed pattern, across countries and across times, in levels
and rates of growth of per capita income” (Lucas, 1988, p.3).  However, recent
theoretical and empirical research has primarily focused on the second half of this
agenda – growth rates.
4  There have been few attempts (discussed below) to explain
formally why the substantial dispersion in per capita income or productivity levels
exists. Differences across countries in productivity levels usually result from the
cumulative effect of a host of prior influences operating gradually and over long
periods of time. Thus it is often difficult to detect the effects of such variables on
growth rates, which may be imperceptible in the short to medium term, even though
their eventual impact on levels can be large. Yet, because growth rates over the very
long run have been uneven, these level differences between countries are
increasing.
5To be sure, economic historians have long been aware of these differences in
income and productivity levels, and participated in the search for a framework within
which to explain them – whether in the context of Gerschenkron’s (1962)
identification of leader and follower countries and degrees of “backwardness” in 19th
century Europe, or in Landes’ (1990) quest for an answer to the fundamental
economic question – “Why are We so Rich and They so Poor?”
6 Much of the focus in
this historical literature is on causal factors omitted from most growth models,
especially institutional, geographic, cultural and policy explanations of the gaps
between high and low income or productivity economies.
A similar focus is evident in cross-country studies of income and productivity
levels. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) argue that the variation in the level of per
capita income is determined by geographical factors (tropical diseases, natural
resource endowment per capita, distance from world markets, and the proportion of
population near coasts), and political and institutional factors (quality of government
institutions, openness to trade, and legacy of colonial rule). They report that the four
geographic explanatory variables alone account for 69 per cent of the variation in per
capita income levels across 83 countries in 1995.
In a study of cross-country levels of output per worker for 1988, Hall and
Jones (1999) first show that differences in physical and human capital across
countries leave much of the variation in output per worker unexplained. They then
demonstrate that physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, and the
Solow residual (and hence output per worker) can be accounted for by “social
infrastructure.” Their measure of social infrastructure is an index covering several
aspects of quality of government as well as the openness of the country to
international trade. Since social infrastructure is endogenous, they use measures of
the historical extent of western European influence as instruments for the quality of
government (distance from the equator, and the extent to which English or a majorEuropean language is spoken), and a measure of predicted trade share (based on
population and geography) as the instrument for openness.  Most of the observed
variation in levels of output per worker is accounted for by social infrastructure.
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The central task of this paper is to account for the substantial differences in
levels of labor productivity across U.S. states in 1880 and at twenty-year intervals
thereafter, and for this purpose we adopt an approach that is explicit in some of the
“levels” studies and implicit in historians’ writings on long-run growth. Rather than
focusing on proximate determinants such as human and physical capital, we identify
fundamental (and exogenous) influences and proceed directly to estimate the
relationship between output per worker and these hypothesized determinants. Such
an approach will indicate either of two possibilities: that a limited number of deeper
determinants account for most level differences across time and place (a result
comforting to the economist’s desire to develop parsimonious models of general
applicability) or that these deeper determinants are more numerous, and vary by
period or place.
In the absence of clear guidance from theory, our selection of deeper
(exogenous) explanatory variables draws partly on the empirical growth literature,
which suggests that certain fundamental influences on productivity levels might apply
fairly generally.
8 One is locational advantage (or disadvantage), as reflected in such
geographic features as access to a coast or navigable waterway, or distance to some
relevantly defined point in the national or international economies. A second is
climate, especially the advantage of temperate over tropical zones in terms of
disease environment, soil fertility, and working conditions. Another is the natural
resource endowment, especially (but not limited to) minerals and fuels.
Several of our hypotheses are also based on evidence and debates that have
been exhaustively evaluated by historians. From this rich literature we drawespecially on one old and one new theme. The well-established theme is that in a
major region of the economy, the South, income levels that were depressed during
the Civil War did not converge on those in the rest of the country until after the
1930s. The reasons for this delayed catch-up appear rooted in the institutional
arrangements in the South dating from the end of slavery.
9 The new theme concerns
the importance of natural resource abundance.  Agricultural land was abundant in the
13 colonies, and the westward territorial expansion of the United States reinforced
this favorable feature of the economy. However, Wright (1990) has argued that a
related phenomenon, the discovery and exploitation of mineral resources, was
significant in underpinning industrial development until 1940.
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3.  Determinants of Productivity Levels
This paper tests the view that the variation in regional U.S. productivity levels
over the past century can be accounted for by a small number of fundamental and
exogenous determinants. Our aim is to include only those deeper determinants that
have persisting rather than transitory effects; hence we are not searching for that
“model” which necessarily best fits each year in the study, considering that year in
isolation.
The requirement that these determinants be non-transitory, fundamental, and
exogenous shortens the list of candidates. Many institutional factors canvassed in the
cross-country growth literature (for example, language, culture, religion, legal system,
or political system) are not likely to be paramount in an inquiry confined within the
borders of the United States. On the other hand, some factors found to be of
importance in cross-country studies are potentially relevant to the explanation of
differences in productivity levels across U.S. states (for example, natural resource
endowments, climate, and certain geographic features).3.1. Minerals Endowment
Economists have reached no consensus as to whether resource abundance
spurs or inhibits growth. Sachs and Warner (1995b) have shown that, since 1960,
resource-abundant countries (defined by measures such as natural resource exports
as a percentage of GDP) have experienced lower growth rates, suggesting that it is a
curse rather than a blessing to be resource rich. One hypothesis in support of this
empirical evidence is that resource-based development is likely to be accompanied
by heavy government involvement, and the political process encourages wasteful
rent seeking.
11  On the other hand, Wright (1990) has argued that much of the
industrial success of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century was based on its ability to exploit quickly and efficiently its mineral resource
base.
12 It may therefore be the case that natural resources confer some sort of initial
advantage for developing economies. Particularly in frontier economies, where labor
and capital are often in scarce supply, having a large initial endowment of resources
may improve the opportunities for economic agents to acquire scarce factors quickly
– to grow extensively, acquiring more capital and labor so the resource base can be
further exploited.
13 This suggests that a region rich in readily extractable natural
resources may record higher levels of output per worker.
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To test for the influence of resource endowment on productivity it would be
ideal to have a measure of total natural resource stocks by state. It is the endowment
(per capita or per worker) that leads to the level effect we here are seeking to
identify. However, state-level data on resource stocks are unavailable, and
production data for some minerals and years are difficult to assign by state. Hence
we use the share of employment in mining as a measure of natural resource
abundance in a state.
15  (Summary statistics of this and other explanatory variables
are reported in Table 1.) A positive sign would be consistent with the frontier
economy and Wright hypotheses.3.2. Climate
In an era where air conditioning, heating, and climate control are standard in
the workplace, it is difficult to think that climate significantly reduces any state’s
average labor productivity. In 1880, however, weather may have severely altered
both the hours worked and the level of efficiency at which one worked. For example,
snowstorms or late spells of cold weather may have affected the timing of planting
crops (small grains) on the Great Plains, and, without climate control, the pace of
work in factories or textile mills may have been hampered by summer heat.
U.S. statistics on weather and temperature at the state level are actually quite
detailed, so we can assess the climate hypothesis more explicitly than has been
possible in many cross-country studies. We used the average annual number of
cooling degree days as our initial climate proxy – a measure which NOAA uses to
determine the need for air conditioning in buildings.
16 Using this measure of climate,
Maine records the lowest value, while Arizona has the highest. If heat impaired labor
productivity, then the expected sign on this variable will be negative (reflecting the
disadvantages of working without air conditioning); moreover, it will decline in
importance over the sample period especially after 1940 as the use of air
conditioning diffuses.
3.3. The Legacy of Slavery
The trajectory of the Southern economy was disrupted by important political
and social events in the mid-nineteenth century. The Civil War (a negative shock)
ushered in a well-known process of relative stagnation and delayed convergence
from below. From 1860 to 1880, income levels in the South fell relative to the rest of
the country and relative to its own 1860 level; incomes only began to convergerapidly in the post-WWII period. Emancipation triggered post-bellum institutional
changes that altered the relationships between factors of production that may have
had a negative impact on the efficiency of production and hence on southern levels
of income per capita. For example, former slave-owners could no longer determine
the number of hours worked and the type of work carried out by the free blacks, nor
could they necessarily influence the efficiency of production through the control of
nutrition and health. Furthermore, in both the workplace and southern society at
large, discrimination and legal restrictions placed on ex-slaves may have limited their
access to education or their ability to secure either physical capital or land. Denying
productive agents these economic opportunities may have decreased the efficiency
of production in the post-bellum era. The heterogeneous institutional response to the
demise of slavery throughout the South therefore might be an important underlying
determinant of differences in the observed productivity levels across states. And this
negative influence on efficiency may have persisted for many decades, as the
economic catch-up of the southern states began only in the 1930s.
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To proxy the legacy of slavery, we use the percentage of the state population
in 1860 that were slaves.
18 As slavery has been associated with a host of factors
detrimental to productivity levels long after emancipation, the expected sign on this
variable would be negative. States with a higher percentage of slaves in 1860 may
have been more resistant to opening up economic opportunities to emancipated
slaves through ownership of land and access to education and jobs; that is, these
states may have exhibited higher degrees of social and legal discrimination, foregone
economic efficiency, and hence lower productivity levels.
3.4. Geography
In country studies, the growth rate and the level of per capita income are both
shown to be positively related to the openness of the economy, conventionallymeasured as the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to income.
19 Other cross-
country studies have emphasized physical impediments to trade.
20  Between U.S.
states there exists only natural barriers to trade as opposed to politically imposed
impediments; thus transport costs likely play a significant role in determining the level
of interregional trade. Additionally, ideas that improved the efficiency of production
may more easily have been transmitted if a state was well served by transportation
and information networks.
The historical literature, especially for the period before the completion of the
national railroad network, emphasizes the advantages accruing to locations with
access to navigable waterways.  During this time, freight rates for water transport
were significantly lower than those for land, with ocean rates the lowest of all.
Interstate trade, especially between non-contiguous states, was clearly facilitated by
access to navigable water – as illustrated by the trade along the Atlantic seaboard
from colonial times on, and the trade in raw materials on the Great Lakes (Taylor,
1951).    International trade would also be favored in coastal states or those with
ocean-navigable rivers compared to those where geographical obstacles imposed
cost barriers to participation in the world economy. Even when innovations in land
transportation eroded these natural advantages, path dependence may have
ensured that the advantages to states with navigable waterways persisted. Cities
which grew up because of natural harbors, or at strategic points on navigable rivers,
and brought favorable external economies with their commercial and industrial
development, did not relocate following the completion of the interstate railroad and
highway systems.
The hypothesis tested here is that an efficiency advantage accrued to states
with natural water access in the late-nineteenth century, and that this advantage
persisted despite the revolution in land transport wrought by the railroad andhighway. What constitutes a navigable waterway (or access to the ocean) is not
straightforward, and may be influenced by investment (e.g. in canals, locks, river-
deepening), or by technological change (e.g. in riverboat design). Both of these may,
in turn, be more likely to be undertaken in higher productivity regions or economies.
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Given the possibility of reverse causation, we define navigable waterways in such a
way that we can assume exogeneity. We capture the productivity effects of location
and openness to interstate and foreign commerce by including a dummy variable
where positive values indicate states that are coastal or border the Great Lakes. We
expect that this dummy variable will be positively related to the level of labor
productivity.
4.  Data and Analysis of Determinants
The dependent variable in this study, what we call labor productivity, is derived from
estimates of personal income per capita for each state. To calculate labor
productivity, the personal income data were first adjusted for differences in price
levels across states, for each of six census years between 1880 (the first year data
for western states are available) and 1980 using “relative” price indexes. This
produced price-adjusted personal income per capita estimates that are calculated
relative to U.S. average prices for a given year. These estimates were then further
adjusted to a per worker basis using the employment-population ratio (or labor input
per capita) in each state. The labor productivity measure is thus (log) price-adjusted
income per worker.
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The data set includes 47 states for 1880 and 48 for years thereafter.
23 We
obtained data on our underlying determinants as well as state productivity for the six
selected census years from 1880 to 1980 such that we could also measure how theeffects of various factors change over a long period of time, something that previous
cross-country studies examining labor productivity levels have not reported.
We make the identifying assumption that the fundamental determinants are
uncorrelated with the random element of our measure of labor productivity, and then
use ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters of the relation. This identifying
assumption seems reasonable. Certainly climatic factors are exogenous, as is
slavery, and the location of a state with respect to navigable water. A strong
justification (as discussed in the next section) can also been made for the exogeneity
of mining activity in a state.
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2. In 1880, 1900, 1920
and 1940, the four identified determinants explain about 70 percent of the variation in
productivity levels across states (using the adjusted R-squared). Figure 2 displays
the overall fit of the equation for 1880 when the variation in state productivity levels
was greatest. States above the 45-degree line produce more price-adjusted output
per worker than our specification predicts, while states below the 45-degree line
produce less than predicted. In the post-World War II period our model is somewhat
less successful, accounting for less than half of the variation in productivity in 1960
and 1980. This result may be due in part to the decline in the dispersion of labor
productivity across states. Less variation in the dependent variable may make it more
difficult to discriminate between competing hypotheses as to why the variation in
levels existed. It is also possible that one or more factors omitted from our
specification emerged as having a significant impact on productivity levels across
states only after 1940 or that underlying factors that drove economic development in
its early stages (such as natural resource abundance or geographical advantages)
are less important for explaining differences today. In a study designed in part to
provide an historical perspective on the more recent work by growth and regionaleconomists, our priority here is to see how far a simple general model could explain
the reasons for variation in state productivity levels at six widely separated dates.
4.1. Minerals Endowment
The coefficient on the measure of mineral endowment has the expected
positive sign in all years, though it falls below conventional significance levels in 1940
and 1960. Except in these two years, states obtained a productivity advantage from
their mining industry after controlling for other influences in our model. In 1880, for
example, 27 states had less than one percent of their workforce in mining while
seven states had more than 10 percent. An increase of 10 percentage points in the
share of mining in a state’s employment was, in that year, associated with an
increase of 11 percent in labor productivity in that state. Moreover, the coefficient on
mining employment is positive and economically significant despite the fact that our
measure of labor productivity adjusts the data for state-level differences in
demographic characteristics. That is, it was possible that the estimated relationship
between mining and labor productivity would be zero since our measure of labor
productivity accounts for the high labor input per capita that the mining sector
typically attracted.
24  Our result, however, is consistent with what Bernard and Jones’
(1996) find for the 1980s. We interpret the positive coefficient as evidence that there
were indeed productivity effects of mineral abundance in addition to the boost to
income per capita that came from the favorable demography and workforce
characteristics associated with mining. In the context of the development of U.S.
states, to be mineral rich led to higher productivity levels.4.2. Climate
It was anticipated that the coefficient on number of cooling-degree days would
have a negative sign, reflecting that climates requiring more air conditioning have
lower levels of productivity or income. There is no support for this proposition in our
basic model. Indeed, in 1980, the only year in which a statistically significant
relationship is recorded, the sign is the opposite to that hypothesized. Alternative
proxies (the number of heating degree days or the sum of heating degree days and
cooling degree days) were considered to check the robustness of our climate
variable; none of these substitutions yielded support for the existence of any
hypothesized relationship with productivity levels, considering either sign or
significance.
25 Climate therefore appears not to account for any of the variation in
productivity levels across states in any of the years in the study once the other
independent influences have been included in the model.
Our approach to understanding the relationship between climate and
productivity has thus far focused on the benefits from controlling climate, but there
are other hypotheses concerning this relationship that warrant consideration. Disease
ecology and agronomic processes can be influenced by climate and may, in turn,
alter productivity; this has led Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) to conclude that
temperate climates are more productive.
26 Masters and McMillan (2000) suggest that
ecological zones experiencing frosts have higher crop yields because frost episodes
alter plant respiration, water-evaporation rates, crop spoilage, topsoil availability, and
the presence of pests and parasites. Similarly, vector and waterborne diseases that
flourish in warmer climates, and which affect human health and productivity if
endemic, are frustrated by frosts. To test for these relationships, we considered two
other alternative proxies that emphasize the importance of climate’s effects through
health and agronomic systems: total accumulation of snow and ice pellets and the
number of days in a year when the minimum temperature was at or below 32F.
27The results (not shown) indicated that there is still no systematic relationship
between climate and productivity across ecological zones in the U.S.
4.3. Legacy of Slavery
The regressions in Table 2 strongly confirm the hypothesis that slavery is
associated with lower levels of productivity.
28 Our expectation was that any
measurable impact of the legacy of slavery in 1880 would fade as the institutions
inhibiting more efficient economic arrangements in the post-bellum South underwent
gradual change. Surprisingly, our proxy measure exerts a negative and significant
influence on interstate variation in labor productivity through 1960, although the
magnitude of the coefficients on this variable decline across the century. The
estimates in Table 2 indicate that as late as 1940, more than seven decades after
emancipation, a state whose population was 10 percent slaves in 1860 would have a
15 percent lower level of productivity. Only in 1980 does the coefficient become
insignificant. Since our data are at 20-year intervals, some caution should be
exercised in terms of pinpointing the precise decline in this variable’s influence. But
there is support here for the view that only in recent decades has the distinct and
independent drag on southern economic efficiency, originating in the slave-plantation
era, finally lifted (Wright, 1987).
To check the robustness of our legacy of slavery variable, we considered an
alternative measure: the number of slaves owned by slaveholders with 20 or more
slaves in 1860 as a percent of the total state population.
29 This proxy captures the
relative importance of plantation slaveholding, recognizing the debate about the
productivity consequences of scale economies in antebellum agriculture (see, for
example, Irwin (1994)). If the greatest dislocation to the institutional arrangements inthe post-bellum South was associated with the end of the plantation system, then this
alternative measure of the legacy of slavery may more precisely capture its impact on
productivity levels in 1880. In Appendix 1, the relationship between productivity and
deeper determinants is re-estimated using this alternative proxy for the legacy of
slavery. A comparison with the results from Table 2 shows almost no change to the
results in any year, with the exception that in 1980 the coefficient on the plantation
slave variable is significant at the 5 percent level, whereas in the original specification
it was not.
To test whether the legacy of slavery variable is simply capturing a “southern
effect” instead of a measure of the intensity of slavery in a state, we re-estimated the
relationship in Table 2 including interaction effects. Specifically, in Table 3 we interact
a dummy variable (where one indicates a slaveholding state) with each of the (non-
slave) explanatory variables and include these with the other explanatory variables
used in the original analysis. Since none of the slope dummies has a coefficient that
is significant at conventional levels, we can reject the hypothesis that the legacy of
slavery variable is standing in for a generic “southern effect.”
4.4. Geography
Finally, there is strong support for the proposition that geography can be an
important, and statistically significant, independent influence on productivity levels.
States that border the sea or Great Lakes have significantly higher productivity in all
years in this study. In 1880 the advantage is a 24 percent lift in labor productivity; this
advantage fluctuates (without discernible trend) in the other years in the study
between 12 and 34 percent. This result is consistent with the findings of cross-
country studies of the income or productivity level effects of access to navigablewaterways. As was suggested in the previous section – despite the ascendancy of
rail, road, and air transport and the corresponding erosion of cost advantages
associated with direct access to navigable waterways – there is no evidence of any
decline in locational advantage. Having access to a navigable waterway appears to
lock in long-term productivity advantages that persist despite technological change.
Here again, we subjected our results to sensitivity analysis, by restricting the
definition of access to navigable water to those states with a seacoast (Appendix 2).
A comparison of the results reported with those in Table 2 indicates that the removal
of the states bordering the Great Lakes reduces the significance of this geographic
variable below the 10 percent significance level in both 1880 and 1980, but otherwise
does not affect the performance of the original specification. We conclude that
access to the Great Lakes is important to the explanation of state productivity
levels.
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5. Endogeneity and Omitted Variables
The methodology employed here requires that the hypothesized determinants
of productivity levels in each state be exogenous. With three of the four independent
variables (climate, slavery, and geography), proxy measures have been chosen that
are unambiguously independent of the level of productivity (or of economic
development more generally) in 1880 and later years. However, the possible
endogeneity of our mining proxy must be considered further.
In principle, the natural resource endowment would seem unambiguously
exogenous to the level of productivity: a region either possesses gold, oil, or copper
or it does not. Moreover, the endowment of minerals is not evenly spread across the
globe - or across political units. Yet the search and exploitation stages of mineraldevelopment may require levels of investment and technology that are positively
related to the level of economic development. If the resource exists, the probability of
its discovery and exploitation may be positively related to the level of development in
a country, although as the history of Middle East oil production illustrates, the
operations of multinational resource firms blur even this generalization.
The expansion of U.S. mining in the nineteenth century, relative to that in
other countries, led to American dominance in world production of most economically
important minerals by early this century (Wright, 1990). David and Wright (1997)
have advanced the view that this achievement resulted in part from the American
lead in relevant scientific and technological knowledge, which in turn was the product
of high U.S. incomes. However, their view is not relevant to an examination of the
experience of states and regions within the United States. There were no barriers to
the flow of capital and technology across state boundaries, and firms and individuals
could take their investment and talents wherever they saw the opportunity for the
highest potential return.
31  In mining, this is likely to have been where the prospect of
mineral discovery was greatest, or where some prior mining activity existed.
32 In this
context, our proxy for the endowment of minerals (the share of mining employment in
a state) is likely to be exogenous. Indeed, mineral discoveries famously precede
economic development in many states in the Mountain and Pacific regions.
The methodology employed here also requires special attention be given to
the appropriate specification of the model. There is understandable concern in
empirical work of this type that the results may be highly sensitive to the choices
made in selecting explanatory variables (Levine and Renelt 1992). First, it should be
noted that our model has been run over six separate data sets (on six years, 20
years apart), and we obtain similar results. The cross-country growth regressions are
unable to perform this type of sensitivity analysis. And second, we investigated two
possibly omitted influences on the variation in productivity levels across states.One candidate variable we have not included is the extent of urbanization. Of
course, it is not at all clear that economic density is strictly exogenous to productivity
levels. High economic density or urbanization levels are symptoms or features of a
high productivity economy rather than (or as well as) being fundamental
determinants. Nevertheless, growth theorists and regional economists have drawn
attention to agglomeration and congestion effects associated with the density of
economic activity, where density is often defined as the measured amount of capital
and labor in a fixed area. Economic density affects productivity positively through
increasing returns in production technologies, positive externalities linked to the
nearness of productive activity, and higher degrees of beneficial specialization.
Ciccone and Hall (1996) develop and test a density index using 1988 U.S. data that
is based on employment effects at the national, state, and county levels. Their model
suggests that if agglomeration effects outweigh congestion effects, then states with
higher density levels will have higher levels of productivity.
There are, however, two serious problems in incorporating their theoretical
approach into our framework. First, there is the issue of constructing a similar
measure of density without comparable county-level data, and then identifying
appropriate instruments for dealing with the endogeneity of density. Many of their
instruments date 120 years prior to their sample period. Analogous instruments in our
study would require identifying factors that existed prior to the formation of the United
States; one might question how appropriate such instruments would be. As an
attempt to resolve both the construction and endogeneity issues, we computed a
measure of density based on the proportion of the state’s population that lived in
cities with populations greater than 100,000 in 1860. That is, a lag of varying years
applied, ranging from 20 in 1880 to 120 in 1980.We found evidence in most years of a positive relationship between our
constructed measure of density and productivity levels, and there was little change to
the signs or significance of other explanatory variables. However, we are cautious
about emphasizing this result given the limitations of our data and the difficulty of
locating appropriate instruments.  Moreover, underlying Ciccone and Hall’s empirical
work is a modelling assumption that all land is equally productive. This means that
they exclude U.S. data on the agricultural and mining sectors when they empirically
test their density index. They also drop those states where mining output contributes
more than 15 percent to total output. To be consistent with their theoretical
assumptions would require abandoning our interest in the relationship between
productivity differences and natural resource endowment, and dropping many high-
productivity states from our sample. Moreover, such an approach would necessitate
ignoring the empirical evidence that suggests that resource endowments are
positively associated with productivity levels across U.S. states.
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Another candidate variable we have possibly omitted is the quality of state
government institutions. Many institutions and rules are non-rival and non-
excludable, thus government can be important in fostering a legal and political
environment that is conducive to productive enterprise. Olson (1982) and North
(1990) are two of many authors who have pointed out how the role of the government
could affect productivity levels.  Of course, applying the insights of this literature to
late-19th and early-20th century U.S. regions requires care. One caveat is that
differences in the role of government may be unimportant within a country since there
are more marked differences across countries in their institutional arrangements than
across U.S. states. But the general importance of a well-functioning state
bureaucracy, clearly defined property rights and enforcement procedures, limited
corruption, and other government attributes favorable to investment and enterprise is
increasingly recognized.
34In the context of this study, the most likely period in which the quality of
government institutions varied greatly by state, and may have impacted significantly
on efficiency, would be at the time of their establishment. Frontier lawlessness as
well as schemes like wildcat banking may have been symptomatic of weak
enforcement of property rights. Institutions were developed to protect individual
output and property from diversion through thievery, squatting, and expropriation.
Thus it is possible that incorporation into the United States itself prevented the
emergence of regional institutional arrangements inimical to growth and productivity
enhancement, and that the subsequent establishment of administrative structures
raised efficiency.
The first states admitted to the union were, of course, the original 13 colonies
on the Eastern seaboard of the United States, while the last of the lower 48 states to
be admitted in 1912 were New Mexico and Arizona. We therefore used as a proxy
the year admitted to the union as a state. The original thirteen colonies will therefore
have the lowest values of our government proxy while the two southwestern states
will have the highest values. If being part of the United States conferred benefits in
the form of stronger enforcement of property rights and more stable political
institutions, then the expected sign would be negative. The date of statehood is
clearly exogenous for most states as it depended on revolution (the original 13);
acquisition by the United States by purchase, war, or other means; or the satisfaction
of minimum population requirements (as with states entering under the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787). Remaining states were admitted under differing economic
conditions, in which the level of income or productivity played no obvious role.
35
It was anticipated that if the quality of government institutions had any impact
on the variation in productivity levels it would be in 1880, when the largest number of
state administrations were relatively new or were yet to graduate from territory status.The regression for 1880 indeed suggests (Appendix 3) the possible existence of such
an impact, and with the predicted negative sign. As anticipated, in later years (with
the anomalous exception of 1940) there is no significant relation between the
measure of government quality and state productivity levels. To test the sensitivity of
our results with respect to our proxy for the quality of government, we consider an
alternative variable: the year of admission to the union as a territory.
36 There are
many cases of lengthy intervals between acquisition of territorial status and
statehood – over 60 years for New Mexico, for example – and the likely efficiency
advantages from acquiring a defined government and administration, discussed
earlier, may well have begun from the date of the former rather than of the latter.
However, the substitution of year of territorial status for year of statehood (not shown)
does not change the expected negative sign on the coefficient for 1880, but reduces
its significance.
6.  Extensions and Discussion
In the previous sections we have offered a simple framework for
understanding the differences in levels of labor productivity across U.S. states and
over time; and we have tested whether a core set of underlying exogenous
determinants provides insight into this issue. Having now identified several
fundamental determinants which are useful in accounting for these productivity
differences, in this section we further analyze two of these factors in more detail with
the aim of disentangling rival explanations canvassed in the literature on empirical
growth and U.S. economic development.6.1. What Explains the Legacy of Slavery?
We have identified the importance of slavery to interstate differences in
productivity, and underscored that its negative impact on economic performance
persisted for many decades following emancipation. Can we go further and
contribute to the debates about what, more precisely, explains the persistence of this
influence, and thus why it eventually waned during the rise of the “new” South?
Explanations for the convergence of the South on national levels of income
and productivity in the second half of the 20
th century are wide-ranging. One
prominent theory is that the demise of sharecropping, an inefficient institutional
arrangement, led to productivity improvements in the South. Several explanations, in
turn, have been advanced to explain the demise of sharecropping, including
increases in the federal minimum wage and the mechanization of cotton harvesting.
Here, we focus on the importance of the latter in explaining sharecropping’s decline,
in part due to the emphasis economic historians have placed on this explanation and
also because the wide variation in cotton mechanization rates across U.S. states is
suited to our state-level analysis.
37 Since cotton production remained especially
important in the ex-slave states at the time mechanization occurred, the possibility
arises of a direct impact on measured productivity levels via the demise in
sharecropping and the introduction of superior technology.   
The national proportion of upland cotton harvested mechanically rose from six
percent in 1949 to 100 percent in 1972.
38 We thus re-estimated our core regression
model for 1960 with the addition of a variable that reflected the extent of
mechanization of the cotton harvest in that year.
39 However, as shown in Appendix 4,
the coefficient on the cotton-mechanization variable was not significantly different
from zero, while the signs and significance on other independent variables remained
unchanged. Whatever role the substitution of machinery for hand harvesting of cottonplayed in the demise of sharecropping and rising rural labor productivity, it does not
seem to have been large enough independently to influence state-wide average
productivity levels in 1960.
6.2. On Latitude and Climate
Earlier, we justified including a measure of climate as an explanatory variable
because of its potential impact on hours of work and the level of efficiency at which
one works, and its influence on diseases and soil fertility. A number of cross-country
studies have also found latitude to be an important factor in accounting for
differences in cross-country income growth rates and income or labor productivity
levels. Hall and Jones (1996, 1999) argue that national economies located in
temperate zones tend to be more successful than those in tropical regions; using the
distance from the equator as a proxy for climate, they find that temperate climates
favor productivity.
40 On the other hand, Nordhaus (1994) finds that latitude
contributes only small, but measurable differences in income across countries.
We did not focus on latitude as a measure of climate in earlier sections of this
paper partly because we had reliable climate statistics that were suited for the tests
of climate hypotheses. Moreover, latitude is highly correlated with our legacy of
slavery variable, and we had solid grounds for retaining a direct measure of the
regional productivity effect of the legacy of slavery. However, given the prominence it
has been assigned in related studies, it is valuable to assess whether latitude is a
good proxy for climate - at least for the case of U.S. states.
The latitude (degrees from the equator) was chosen as that of the largest city
in the state in the relevant year, so this varied (slightly) between the years in this
study. The values of the other climate measures did not vary, as they are based oncity data (usually for multiple cities) using meteorological observations averaged over
many years. In Table 4 the direct correlation is displayed between latitude and each
of the five other measures of climate. The correlation with latitude varies according to
the selected measure of climate, but all the correlations are quite strong. This leaves
open the question of which climatic feature is most relevant to the determination of
productivity levels, and does not rule out the possibility that latitude is a good proxy
for the effect of a region’s climate on its level of productive efficiency.
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7.  Conclusion
In the search for convincing explanations for the persistence of massive
differences in productivity levels, and hence of living standards, we find in the
historical experience of the United States a fruitful natural extension to the cross-
country approach. Indeed, the analysis of states may offer a more fertile testing
ground for competing hypotheses because, unlike countries, states share a common
language, a similar culture, and likely have the same access to new technologies.
Such features have often been difficult to control for properly in cross-country
analysis.
This paper was motivated by the empirical observation that labor productivity
levels showed considerable variation across U.S. states at six census years from
1880 to 1980. In 1880 the differences were quite substantial, with the lowest-ranked
state having a level of labor productivity only 18 per cent of that of the highest-
ranked; whereas by 1980 the lowest-ranked state had risen to 60 percent of the top
performer.
To account for this productivity dispersion, we have tested a number of
hypotheses drawn from both the growth and economic history literatures. Our resultssuggest that a small number of exogenous variables (institutional, resource, and
geographic characteristics) do extremely well in capturing the variation in productivity
levels across states for 100 years of U.S. history. The relationship is especially
strong through 1940, where our specification accounts for approximately 70 percent
of the variation in productivity levels across states.
Consistent with historians’ emphasis on institutional impediments, we find that
the legacy of slavery has a persistently pernicious effect on productivity levels well
into the 20
th century. On the other hand, productivity levels were positively associated
with both mineral abundance and geographic features suited to transportation. While
some studies have found growth rates to be negatively correlated with natural
resource abundance, our positive relationship with productivity levels seems quite
plausible; particularly in frontier economies, having a large initial endowment of
resources may have propelled the acquisition of scare factors (capital and labor), and
permitted further exploitation of resources. Over the course of development, states
may have been able to overcome the tyranny of geography by constructing locks and
deepening rivers; nevertheless, we find that states initially blessed with a seaport or
located on the Great Lakes possessed a built-in advantage for trade (and
settlement), which resulted in long-term benefits to their productivity levels. Finally, in
contrast to the cross-country literature, we find no systematic role for either climate or
governmental institutions. In part, this may reflect the smaller degree of variation of
these factors within a country.
We have contributed to the analysis of why levels of labor productivity differ
across space and time, complementing the more orthodox economic analysis of the
reasons for variation in rates of growth. We have argued the case for a direct attack
on the deeper determinants of levels of productivity, though we recognize the
difficulty of the task given the paucity of clear theoretical guidance in the growth
literature, and are aware of the ensuing methodological limitations. The challengefacing growth economists is to better explain why there are high- and low-productivity
economies, and hence rich and poor societies. In responding to this challenge, we
have suggested that the historical experience of U.S. states offers a valuable source
of pertinent evidence for developing models that explain these differences. Our
cross-state and historical approach thus complements the cross-country studies
relating to recent years.
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American Economic Review 80, 651-68.Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics
Standard 
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Percentage of workforce in mining
     1880 5.20 9.80 0.00 38.50
     1900 4.00 5.50 0.00 18.90
     1920 3.20 4.40 0.00 21.00
     1940 2.90 4.20 0.10 21.70
     1960 1.60 2.20 0.00 11.00
     1980 1.70 2.70 0.10 14.90
Average number of cooling degree days (100's) 11.59 8.49 2.68 41.62
Percentage of 1860 population in slavery 10.50 17.90 0.00 57.20
Percentage of 1860 population in slavery on  5.20 10.90 0.00 38.50
     large plantations
Percentage of cotton harvested  12.56 23.83 0.00 87.00
     mechanically in 1960
Year statehood status acquired 1835 41.91 1787 1912
Number of States
Access to ocean or Great Lakes  28
Access to ocean 21
Notes: 
See text for sources and details. Access to ocean or Great Lakes refers to those states that
border an ocean or one of the Grat Lakes.Table 2. Explaining Productivity Levels Across U.S. States
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Constant 6.106** 6.166** 7.308** 7.032** 8.529** 9.682**
(0.075) (0.065) (0.038) (0.059) (0.040) (0.046)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.011* 0.014* 0.010* 0.013 0.010 0.016**
   in mining (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
[0.039] [0.035] [0.039] [0.178] [0.160] [0.009]
Average number of cooling -0.0001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008*
   degree days (100's) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.979] [0.441] [0.380] [0.447] [0.125] [0.026]
Percentage of 1860 population  -0.019** -0.021** -0.016** -0.015** -0.007** -0.004*
   in slavery (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012]
Access to ocean or Great 0.238** 0.200** 0.182** 0.344** 0.123** 0.117**
   Lakes (0.072) (0.065) (0.039) (0.054) (0.032) (0.035)
[0.002] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Adjusted R-Squared 0.71 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.45 0.22
Number of observations 47 48 48 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Table 3. Specification test for the impact of slavery 
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Constant 6.122** 6.159** 7.317** 7.045** 8.523** 9.666**
(0.100) (0.079) (0.042) (0.065) (0.040) (0.050)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.011 0.020** 0.010* 0.014 0.013 0.018**
   in mining (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006)
[0.104] [0.008] [0.050] [0.192] [0.140] [0.006]
Slave dummy times  -0.017 -0.031* -0.012 -0.026 0.0001 -0.008
   percentage of workforce in (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014)
   mining [0.100] [0.046] [0.438] [0.188] [0.994] [0.594]
Average number of cooling  -0.0005 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007*
   degree days (100's) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.933] [0.653] [0.660] [0.686] [0.179] [0.027]
Slave dummy times average 0.001 0.0002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005
   number of cooling degree (0.01) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
   days (100's) [0.906] [0.072] [0.609] [0.549] [0.282] [0.167]
Percentage of 1860 population -0.020** -0.027** -0.016** -0.015** -0.007** -0.004**
   in slavery (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Access to ocean or Great 0.224* 0.207* 0.166** 0.325** 0.132** 0.147**
   Lakes (0.109) (0.084) (0.053) (0.067) (0.043) (0.049)
[0.045] [0.018] [0.003] [0.000] [0.004] [0.005]
Slave dummy times access 0.016 0.008 0.034 0.024 -0.004 -0.063
   to ocean or Great Lakes (0.138) (0.121) (0.062) (0.086) (0.058) (0.069)
[0.906] [0.950] [0.585] [0.783] [0.942] [0.366]
A d j u s t e d  R - S q u a r e d 0 . 6 90 . 7 80 . 7 70 . 6 70 . 4 30 . 2 0
Number of observations 47 48 48 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Table 4. The relationship between latitude and climate
Correlation matrix
Cooling Heating Sum of
Degree Degree Cooling and Minimum
Days Days Heating Days Snowfall Temperature Latitude
Cooling Degree Days 1.00
Heating Degree Days -0.84 1.00
Sum of Cooling & Heating Days -0.63 0.95 1.00
Snowfall -0.72 0.87 0.84 1.00
Minimum Temperature -0.77 0.94 0.91 0.83 1.00
Latitude -0.85 0.90 0.79 0.73 0.76 1.00
Notes:
Each day that the air temperature for a day is above 65F produces one cooling degree day.
Each day that the air temperature for a day is below 32F produces one heating degree day. 
If the average temperature exceeds 65F for a 30-day month, that produces 150 cooling degree days.
Snowfall refers to the average annual total accumulation of snow and ice pellets in inches.
Minimum termperature is the number of days when the minimum termperature was 32F or less.
Latitude for a state is based on the latitude for the largest city in the state.
See the text and footnotes for sources.Appendix 1. Robustness test of legacy of slavery: substituting large plantation slave population
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Constant 6.076** 6.123** 7.290** 7.013** 8.520** 9.678**
(0.077) (0.071) (0.041) (0.060) (0.039) (0.046)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.013* 0.019** 0.012* 0.014 0.012 0.016**
   in mining (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
[0.012] [0.004] [0.024] [0.154] [0.143] [0.007]
Average number of cooling -0.003 0.00006 0.00007 0.001 0.004 0.008*
   degree days (100's) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.454] [0.984] [0.973] [0.671] [0.103] [0.018]
Percentage of 1860 population  -0.028** -0.032** -0.024** -0.023** -0.010** -0.005*
   in slavery on large   (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
   plantations [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Access to ocean or Great 0.263** 0.230** 0.195** 0.359** 0.131** 0.120**
   Lakes (0.071) (0.070) (0.043) (0.055) (0.033) (0.036)
[0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Adjusted R-Squared 0.66 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.41 0.21
Number of observations 47 48 48 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Appendix 2. Robustness test of access to navigable waterways
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Constant 6.203** 6.238** 7.343** 7.141** 8.583** 9.748**
(0.055) (0.046) (0.033) (0.058) (0.039) (0.043)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.008 0.011 0.010* 0.008 0.005 0.010
   in mining (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
[0.100] [0.062] [0.046] [0.364] [0.484] [0.127]
Average number of cooling -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.004 0.006
   degree days (100's) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.763] [0.673] [0.576] [0.833] [0.197] [0.059]
Percentage of 1860 population -0.020** -0.022** -0.016** -0.015** -0.006** -0.003
   in slavery  (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.051]
Access to ocean  0.173* 0.169** 0.201** 0.311** 0.084* 0.050
(0.069) (0.061) (0.045) (0.061) (0.039) (0.042)
[0.016] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.036] [0.239]
Adjusted R-Squared 0.67 0.75 0.79 0.63 0.36 0.08
Number of observations 47 48 48 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Appendix 3. Explaining Productivity Levels Across U.S. States
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Constant 10.487** 8.108** 7.289** 9.950** 8.250** 8.492**
(1.847) (1.690) (1.025) (1.297) (0.725) (0.843)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.014* 0.017* 0.010* 0.015 0.010 0.013*
   in mining (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
[0.017] [0.030] [0.039] [0.147] [0.211] [0.039]
Average number of cooling 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.007*
   degree days (100's) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
[0.612] [0.213] [0.405] [0.204] [0.144] [0.049]
Percentage of 1860 population  -0.021** -0.022** -0.016** -0.016** -0.007** -0.003
   in slavery (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.057]
Year statehood status  -0.002* -0.001 0.10E-4 -0.002* 0.15E-3 0.001
   acquired (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.40E-3) (0.46E-3)
[0.024] [0.259] [0.985] [0.030] [0.702] [0.165]
Access to ocean or Great 0.167* 0.169* 0.182** 0.287** 0.128** 0.137**
   Lakes (0.065) (0.065) (0.043) (0.052) (0.032) (0.037)
[0.014] [0.013] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Adjusted R-Squared 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.70 0.44 0.23
Number of observations 47 48 48 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Appendix 4. The effects of mechanization of cotton harvest on 1960 productivity
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker
Independent Variable
Constant 8.534** 8.526** 8.618**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Percentage of workforce  0.010 0.012 0.009
   in mining (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
[0.172] [0.150] [0.237]
Average number of cooling 0.004 0.004 -0.006*
   degree days (100's) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.261] [0.283] [0.042]
Percentage of 1860 population  -0.006**
   in slavery  (0.001)
[0.000]
Percentage of 1860 population -0.010**
   on large slave plantations (0.002)
[0.000]
Percentage of cotton 0.0004 0.0005 0.001
   harvested mechanically (0.0007) (0.224) (0.001)
[0.528] [0.475] [0.090]
Access to ocean or Great 0.123** 0.130** 0.053
  Lakes (0.032) (0.033) (0.038)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.167]
Adjusted R-Squared 0.44 0.41 0.05
Number of Observations 48 48 48
Notes:
White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
P-values are shown in square brackets. One or two stars on coefficient indicate significance 5-
percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See text for sources and definitions of variables.Figure 1. Price-adjusted state income per worker
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1 This wide variation persists even when states are aggregated into regions. The South
Atlantic region had a level of labor productivity only 38 per cent that of the Pacific region
(Mitchener and McLean, 1999).
2 For example, GDP per worker in both Morocco and Thailand was approximately 18 percent
of that in the United States in 1990.
3 Since the U.S. average level of labor productivity is the weighted sum of that of the states,
no account of the sustained rise in U.S. productivity levels over the past century is going to be
complete without an understanding of the forces producing the changing regional
contributions to that outcome. A second reason for attempting to account for the range in
productivity levels across states is that the variation in state labor productivity accounts, in
turn, for the major part of the variation in their living standards. Differences in the level of
nominal income per capita between states in any year can be decomposed into three
elements: differences in prices, labor input per capita, and a ‘residual’ measure of labor
productivity. Only a small portion of the variation in incomes across states in any of the six
years in the study is due to variation in prices - from minus one to plus 16 percent. Variation in
labor input per capita contributes between 9 and 28 percent across these dates.  The
remaining difference in income levels (56 to 84 per cent) is attributed to variations in the
average efficiency of workers. This analysis is reported in Mitchener and McLean (1999).
4 The relevant literature is well surveyed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Temple (1999).
5 This has led to the suggestion that “divergence in relative productivity levels and living
standards is the dominant feature of modern economic history” (Pritchett 1997, p.3).
6 See Landes (1998) for an extended discussion; and Olson (1996) for another perspective on
Landes’ question. Further examples are the attempts to account for the persisting differences
in income levels between North and South American economies provided in the analysis of
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997); the interpretation by Jones (1981) of the reasons for
European economic dominance after 1500; and the even longer-sweeping surveys of
economic perfomance by Lal (1998) and Diamond (1997).
7 The importance of non-conventional influences has likewise been stressed in studies of the
determinants of labor productivity levels across U.S. states in recent years. Bernard and
Jones (1996) highlight the relative size of particular sectors, and note especially that states
with the highest private non-farm labor productivity levels after 1963 were also those with the
highest shares of output originating in mining. And in an investigation of the sources of inter-
state variation in gross state product per worker in 1988, Ciccone and Hall (1996) report that                                                                                                                            
more than half can be attributed to the agglomeration effects arising from the density of
employment. See also Ram (1999).
8 In addition to previously cited references, see also Bloom and Sachs (1998), Collier and
Gunning (1999), Masters and McMillan (2000), Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999), and
Temple and Johnson (1998).
9  See Ransom and Sutch (1977) and Wright (1986).
10 Thereafter, the basis of growth, and especially of economic leadership relative to other
early-industrializing countries, shifted to knowledge-based activities (Nelson and Wright,
1992).
11 Matsuyama (1992) proposes an alternative model which suggests that countries choosing
to exploit their comparative advantage in natural resources may lock themselves into a long-
run, low growth path if the neglected manufacturing sector has more favorable externalities.
See also Redding (1999).
12 For a broader historical discussion of the role of natural resource abundance in American
economic growth, see Abramovitz and David (1996).
13 Related themes are developed in Findlay (1995, Chapters 5 and 6).
14 Some fairly direct support is reported by Bernard and Jones (1996) in their study of
productivity by sector across U.S. states since 1963: those states with more than 20 percent
of private non-farm product originating in mining have higher levels of labor productivity than
non-mining states. Indirect support is provided by Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) who
find that levels of per capita income across countries in 1995 are positively related to deposits
of natural resources.
15  Our data sources are Miller and Brainerd (1957), Perloff et al (1960), and the U.S.
censuses.
16 Each day that the air temperature for a day is above 65 degrees F produces one cooling
degree day. This means that if the average temperature is five degrees above 65F for a 30-
day month, then that is 150 cooling degree days. Data are from various issues of the
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
17 Wright (1974, 1986) has argued that the antebellum growth in the South was
unsustainable, with or without the war, due to the decline in worldwide demand for cotton.
Alternatively, Ransom and Sutch (1977) have focused on the labor supply effects of African
Americans in response to emancipation, suggesting that the decline in Southern output is
attributable to a reduction in hours worked by former slaves. These explanations, and others
by Temin (1976), Fogel and Engerman (1974), Brinkley (1997), and Irwin (1994), shed light
on the decline in southern per capita income after the war.                                                                                                                            
18 Slave population data are from the U.S. Census of 1860.
19  For a survery of postwar evidence, see Sachs and Warner (1995a).
20 Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) find that countries with access to navigable waterways
or with primarily coastal populations have higher levels of income.
21 This applies particularly to the issue of whether states along the Mississippi river system
should be classified as having access to navigable water, and which states in which years.
Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999, p.4) employ a definition of navigable rivers as those that
can accommodate vessels with a minimum draft of three meters; they assert that anything
smaller would not be considered “ocean-going.”
22 The estimation methods and data sources are provided in Mitchener and McLean (1999),
especially Appendix 1 which describes the derivation of the state price relatives. Because the
relative price indexes are computed at a point in time (and not over time as is the case with
deflated series), the price-adjusted dollar values of the labor productivity figures across our
six time periods are not directly comparable. Note also that the price variation was greatest in
1880, when a 33 percentage-point variation occurred around the U.S. average price level
and, unsurprisingly, when the highest price levels were recorded in the Mountain states.
23 Because Alaska and Hawaii only become states in 1959 and reliable data are unavailable
for earlier periods, we exclude these two states from our overall analysis. No estimates for
state personal income per capita are available for Oklahoma in 1880, so we exclude it from
our analysis for that year. The Dakota Territories are separated out into North and South
Dakota for purposes of analysis in 1880, even though they received statehood in 1889. We
also refer to Montana, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona as
“states,” even though they were technically still territories in 1880; their boundaries did not
change between territory status and statehood.
24 The demographic characteristics of many western states in the late nineteenth century –
high masculinity ratios and a high percentage of people of working age – may reflect
employment in resource-based industries (Mitchener and McLean, 1999).
25  We also investigated whether climate influenced productivity via a quadratic relationship,
but none was found.
26  For variation in the disease ecology across states, see Brinkley (1997) and Coehlo and
McGuire (1997). For a longer run perspective across countries, see Jones (1981).
27 Data are from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
28 In a simple univariate regression for 1880, the coefficient on SLAVE is negative in sign, of a
large magnitude, and is statistically significant (t-statistic = -6.94). In 1880, if a state’s slave
population increased by one percentage point, its relative income fell by $3.40. The mean                                                                                                                            
level of productivity in 1880 was $483.75 (SD of $184.61) and the mean level of slavery
across all states was 10.5 percent. So for a state such as Mississippi, with a slave population
in 1860 that is 55 percent of the total, our model predicts that its productivity level should be
$151.30 lower than the mean. Mississippi’s actual productivity level in 1880 was $239.18 or
$244.57 below average. Slavery alone thus accounts for around 62% of Mississippi’s lower
productivity level.
29 These data are also from the U.S. Census of 1860.
30  In addition, we substituted a proxy of navigable waterway that also included states
bordering navigable sections of the Mississippi river system as reported by Mellinger et al
(1999). (We are grateful to Andrew Mellinger for assistance with these data.) The augmented
proxy was never significant. Separately entering a proxy for states bordering navigable rivers
confirmed that there is no systematic relationship with state productivity levels.
31 The important contributions (as documented by David and Wright (1997)) made by faculty
and graduates of geology or mining programs at schools such as Yale, Columbia, and
Harvard to the discovery and development of minerals in the far western states, well
illustrates the point.
32 An assessment of the determinants of gold discoveries across U.S. states in the late
nineteenth century is contained in Eichengreen and McLean (1994), who emphasize the
importance of recent settlement (by Europeans) to the timing of such finds: few occurred in
states that were long settled.
33 Bernard and Jones (1996) suggest that the resource sector may be important for explaining
productivity differences across states in the 1980s.
34 The effect of corruption on productive efficiency is but one theme in this literature: see
especially Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995).
35  Indeed, at the time of attaining statehood, some states (especially in the Midwest) had
relatively low incomes while others (especially in the West) were among those with the
highest per capita incomes. The exogeneity assumption for statehood appears reasonable
based on this reading of history.
36 Dates of statehood and of admission as a territory are from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States. For Texas, we use the date of congressional annexation in 1845 to mark the
official date of statehood rather than the year of 1836 when Texas gained independence from
Mexico and formed a republic.
37 See, for example, Musoke and Olmstead (1982) and Whatley (1985).
38 The numbers are from Statistics on Cotton and Related Data 1920-73 (Statistical Bulletin
No. 535, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Washington                                                                                                                            
D.C.), p.218.
39 In 1960 the national average was 51 percent, and the values for individual cotton-growing
states ranged from one to 87 percent.
40 Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to climate
and levels of income per capita. See also Masters and McMillan (2000), Mellinger, Sachs and
Gallup (1999), and Ram (1999).  Diamond (1997) claims to identify a link between longitude
and latitude and productivity over the very long run.
41  Substituting latitude for the number of cooling degree days in the model reported in Table 2
produced similar results (not reported). The use of the proxy for climate in our preferred
model is due to the higher direct correlation between slavery and latitude than between
slavery and cooling degree days.